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approach to mounting internal and external disequilibrium that would  make 
demand  restraint  unnecessary.  That  was  sweet  music  to  the  ears  of  a 
president  elected  because  of  his  pledge  to  wider  popular  political 
participation,  who was persuaded that prosperity was a necessary condition 
to its success. Unfortunately,  as the next chapter shows, the realization was 
much different than the expectation. 
3  Adjustment in the 1980s: From 
International Monetarism to the 
Plano Cruzado 
As our discussion has shown, Brazilian adjustment policies,  even before the 
second  oil  shock,  were  in  need  of  a  midterm  correction.  Simonsen’s 
orthodox approach was rejected  barely after its announcement and before it 
could be implemented. Delfim’s more optimistic heterodoxy was much more 
congenial. But it too proved inadequate, both because of its own limitations 
and  the  deteriorating  international  economic  environment. Brazil  by  198  1 
was in the midst of a harsh austerity program designed to compensate for its 
mounting external disequilibrium.  It could hope to succeed only if  external 
credit  were restored.  The Mexican  debt  crisis in August  1982 dashed  that 
hope and soon sent Brazil scurrying to the International Monetary Fund for 
assistance. 
The experience  with  the  IMF was  tumultuous  and  marked  by  repeated 
letters  of  intent  and  waivers  for  nonfulfilled  targets.  Improved  external 
performance  came  partially  at  the  expense  of  domestic  inflation  and 
investment objectives.  Still,  with  the large increase in exports of  manufac- 
tures in  1984, the  economy  began to show signs of recovery  and resumed 
growth. The new civilian government that took office in  1985 soon defined 
itself as committed to expansion rather than macroeconomic restraint. Ample 
reserves  made  it  possible  to  delay  any  long-term  agreement  with  private 
creditors and to allow the extended program with the Fund to lapse. 
Accelerating  growth  in  1985 was accompanied  by  accelerating  inflation 
that  threatened  the  transition  to  sustained  growth  and  provoked  popular 
discontent  and  political  dissatisfaction.  The Pluno  Cruzado,  in  February 
1986,  was  the  heterodox  response.  In  the  mold  of  similar  programs 
previously launched in Argentina and Israel, it identified inertial inflation as 
the source of inflationary rates that had already exceeded annual rates of 300 
percent.  It  was  a  bold,  and  temporarily  successful,  way  to  devise  a 
recession-free  domestic  adjustment to match that of the external  accounts. 291  BmzWChapter 3 
But it is necessary to begin the story of adjustment in the 1980s, that would 
eventually  lead  to  the  Cruzado  Plan,  with  Delfim’s  earlier  heterodox 
experiment. 
3.1  Supply-side International Monetarism 
Delfim’s  program  to  reduce  inflation  while  abetting  growth  had  four 
components.  In  sectoral terms,  first priority would  go to  agriculture and 
energy. The former bore much of the weight, and hopes, of the policy. It was 
felt that rapid growth of apculture would do the following: end the relative 
food price shocks that had been so troublesome in recent years; provide the 
exports to assure continued service of  the debt; permit  energy substitution 
through the alcohol program; and facilitate more equal income distribution. 
There  was  also  then,  more  than  ever,  a  self-evident need  to  give  equal 
importance  to  increased  supplies  of  energy,  whether  from  domestic 
production of  crude or oil substitutes. Both sectors, agriculture and energy, 
were thus assured all the subsidized credit they needed or wanted. 
Macroeconomic policy was based on a theory of  cost-push inflation, but 
was not always consistent with it. On the one hand, Delfim set out to undo 
the previous high real interest rates through strict controls in September 1979 
that  brought  nominal  rates  sharply  down.  Yet  at  the  same  time,  many 
administered prices were freed during the fall. In November a new wage law 
provided  for  more  frequent  semiannual  inflation  adjustments  as  well  as 
relative  gains  for  lower  wage  workers.  While  these  actions  accelerated 
inflationary pressures, the price increases were blamed  upon  the  previous 
administration. On the positive side, the fiscal deficit was somewhat reduced 
and a potential labor conflict averted. The price increases set up what was 
hoped would be a substantial deceleration beginning in  1980 that could be 
claimed as a policy success. 
On the external side, Delfim decreed a maxi-devaluation of 30 percent in 
December, the first large devaluation in more than ten years of  experience 
with the crawling peg. Export subsidies and prior deposits on imports were 
removed as redundant after the realignment of prices. In addition, alert to the 
deterioration in the balance of payments, Delfim actively took new measures 
to encourage private foreign borrowing to rebuild reserves. 
The  final  element  was  the  true  novelty  in  the  program.  Delfim 
preannounced  the  rates  of  both  monetary  correction and  devaluation that 
would prevail during 1980, the former at 45 percent, the latter at 40 percent. 
Credit was  to be  limited  accordingly. This move  was  intended to  change 
inflationary expectations; if  only everyone believed that  inflation would be 
45 percent in  1980, then it could be. Heavy doses of controls reinforced the 
message. 
The  Delfim  strategy,  as  it  thus  took  form,  was  a  mixture  of  three 
approaches: the  standard IMF formula of  devaluation to stimulate exports 
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on a close relation between changes in domestic and international prices; and 
traditional  Brazilian  interventionism  to  induce  desired  supply  response 
through  subsidies.  The  program  created  confusion  in  the  international 
financial community. At first, when the thrust was toward freeing markets in 
the  Christmas  package  of  December  1979, foreign  bankers  applauded;  as 
disequilibrium became rampant in  1980, they rebelled. The bankers had the 
final word.  Their refusal to roll  over the debt without a more conventional 
stabilization package led to a new approach in November  1980. 
The results  of  Delfim’s  heterodox  approach  had  by  that  time  fallen  far 
short  of  its  objectives.  Although  economic  growth  in  1980 exceeded  7 
percent, it was fueled by consumer demand. The ratio of investment to GDP 
declined.  Financial  assets, now  yielding  much  less than  the  inflation  rate, 
were abandoned in favor of the speculative acquisition of consumer durables 
and  real  estate.  Meanwhile,  inflation  soared  and  crossed  the  three-digit 
threshold  for the  first  time  in  Brazilian  history.  And  the  current  account 
deficit  in  1980, under  the  impact  of  additional  increases  in  the  oil  price, 
attained  a record  $12.4 billion and required  massive finance.  The net  debt 
stood at almost $60 billion, three times the level of  exports, compared to a 
1977 debuexport ratio of little more than two. 
Delfim’s  policy  failed  in  1979/80  for  four  reasons.  First,  it  did  not 
confront the  excess  demand  under  which  the  economy  was  laboring.  The 
public  sector  deficit  in  1980,  excluding  monetary  correction,  is  variously 
estimated  as between  5 and  7 percent  of  GDP.  Although  possibly  smaller 
than the  1979 level,  the deficit remained high  and could not be voluntarily 
funded  in  the  controlled  financial  markets  of  1980;  instead  it  had  to  be 
monetized.  Unlike  the  “miracle”  years,  domestic  supply  was  not  elastic 
enough to  satisfy demand. Capacity was nearly  fully utilized, especially in 
the rapidly growing sectors. 
A  second  factor  was  the  wage  law  of  November  1979  that  conceded 
semiannual rather than annual inflation adjustments.  Increasing labor unrest 
in 1979, as accelerating inflation eroded real wages, had put pressure on the 
government  to  devise  a  new  scheme.  Delfim,  in  a  bid  to  secure  order, 
accepted not only more frequent adjustment but also a law that favored the 
lowest  paid.  The  adjustment  of  their  wages  was  to  be  greater  than  the 
inflation index. These two concessions, in theory, would have led to large 
increases  in  real  wages.  Many  have  therefore  singled  out  the  law  as  a 
principal determinant of the doubled inflation rate. 
The independent effect of the law is not so readily established. The World 
Bank mission to Brazil in  1982 concluded: “A  simple examination of trends 
in  total  and  per  unit  labor costs in  industry  from November  1979 to May 
1982  suggests  that  the  formula  was  not  a  major  contributing  factor  to 
inflation”  (World Bank  1984, 108). Among the reasons are high turnover at 
the bottom of the wage hierarchy,  the lag in the new official consumer price 
index, the INPC, (to which the wages were linked) behind general inflation, 293  BrazilKhapter 3 
and the more generous settlements and readjustments that already prevailed 
in  the private sector. But what the law did do, because wage correction was 
based  exclusively  on  past  trends,  was  to  make  impossible  significant 
deceleration in inflation without a large real wage increase. The much lower 
inflation target of  45 percent for 1980 was thus doomed from the start. 
The third reason for the failure of  Delfim’s strategy was the absence of 
competitive imports to discipline domestic prices, as international monetarist 
theory required. Brazil was in the midst of  a balance of  payments crisis in 
1980, despite rapidly rising exports,  as  a result of  higher oil  prices  and 
increased interest rates. Imports remained controlled, as they had been for 
several years. It was an inopportune moment to experiment with  this new 
approach, as Argentina and Chile were also to discover. 
Finally,  this  was  not  the  moment  to reverse  inflationary  expectations. 
Rising import costs, fears of oil shortages, and a demonstrable commitment 
to  expansionary  policies  all  negated  the  rhetoric  of  pre-fixed  monetary 
correction and exchange rage devaluation. Rather, as the disparity between 
reality and the government forecast widened, the only uncertainty was when 
the policy would change. Expectations, and attendant financial speculation 
and holding back of  exports, focused on the timing of  devaluation and not 
the announced inflation target for the year. 
Delfim  has  been  rightly  critized for  the  errors  of  this  aberrant policy. 
Bolivar Lamounier and Alkimar Moura (1986, 173-74)  are especially harsh: 
The  monumental  failure  of  that  heterodox  experiment  of  economic 
policy can, in part, be explained by the attempt to implement a strategy of 
economic growth without consideration for the accentuated deterioration 
in the conditions of  the international economy in 1979 and 1980.  . . .It 
cannot  be  said,  however,  that  there  had  been  a  generalized  inability, 
among the government technocrats, to interpret the unequivocal signals of 
economic difficulty arising from the international economy. The predomi- 
nant attitude was to try to exorcize such ghosts with the optimistic rhetoric 
inherited from the years of the Brazilian miracle. 
3.2  The Second Oil Shock 
Exorcising ghosts was not enough in  the face of  the new  strong external 
shocks Brazil  experienced  after  1979.  Table  3.1  presents  the  balance  of 
payments effects of  the second oil shock, the interest rate  shock, and the 
attendant international recession. These show how Brazil was overwhelmed 
by  the adverse turn of  the external environment. More than half  of  the $4 
billion deterioration in the current account in  1979 is explained by  rising oil 
prices and higher interest rates. A still larger part of the $1.5 billion increase 
in net interest payments, $1.2 billion, is accounted for by the interest due on 
the change in  accumulated debt (and smaller receipts on reduced reserves) 
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Table 3.1  The Balance of Payments and  the Second Oil Shock (in billions of 
U.S.  dollars) 




External effects resulting from? 
Higher oil price 
Reduced export volume 
Higher interest rate 
Actual net debtb 




-  1.0  -2.8  -2.8 
-  2.7  -4.2  -6.3 
-6.0  -  10.0  -  12.4 
1.2  0.8 
-9.2  -11.4 
-11.0  -  16.3 
-1.8  -5.7 
-0.6  -  1.4 
-0.3  -1.1 
36.2  46.4  57.7 
45.6  55.8 
44.8  54.0 
45.8  55.7 
-7.1  -6.1 
-  2.4 
-2.5  -5.9 
68.0  83.5 
64.5  78.3 
64.9  82 5 
65.9  81.46 
"External effects calculated assuming that: oil price was fixed at 1978 nominal value; effect of reduced export 
volume was as in table 2. I, using deviation from  1974-78  average growth of 3.1 percent; and interest rate 
effect was based on constant 1978 average real interest rate (with respect to U.S. GNP deflator). 
bNet debt inclusive of  short-term debt, from F'aulo  Nogueira Batista (1985). 
'Export increase: export response to 10 percent real devaluation. Import limits: real imports held constant at 
1978 levels. Slower growth: Unitary elasticity effect on imports of product growth at 3 percent. 
Conversely,  an  array  of  feasible  alternative  policy  efforts  would  have 
provided  only  modest  offsets to  the  balance of  payments deterioration  in 
1979. Neither  export promotion,  strict  import  limits,  nor  slowed  growth 
taken individually would have been equal to the effect of higher oil prices. It 
would  have  taken  all  together to begin  to  match  the  adverse  turn in  the 
international environment and the inertial effect of rising debt. 
In 1980 even higher oil prices and interest rates made matters considerably 
worse.  The actual worsening  of  the balance of payments  was smaller than 
would have been anticipated owing to the 58 percent increase in the value of 
exports since 1978. So substantial was the gain in earnings that in the absence 
of the rise in oil prices, Brazil would have enjoyed a healthy trade surplus in 
1980. But oil prices did rise and there was little room for maneuver. 
Delfim inherited the problem of inadequate adjustment; it was not simply of 
his  own  making.  Starting  from  its  much  higher  debt  in  1978  and  the 
continuing large volume of  oil imports, Brazil had much less flexibility in 
dealing with the second oil shock than the first. That said, however, there was 
a strong argument for conserving what few degrees of freedom remained. A 
more cautious policy would have marginally improved balance of payments 
performance, prevented spreads-and  hence interest costs-from  rising, and 
retained  domestic credibility.  A  more conservative policy  would  have also 
avoided exchange rate appreciation that would later have to be undone. The 
beneficial effects of the December  1979 devaluation were more than wiped 
out by inadequate correction that failed to keep pace with domestic inflation. 295  BraziUChapter 3 
3.3  he-IMF Orthodox Stabilization 
Expectations did turn out to be  rational. The virtually universal disbelief 
in  the  adequacy  of  the  initial  heterodox  policy  was  confirmed  by  its 
abandonment in November and December of 1980 under increasing pressure 
from  foreign  creditors.  Unlike  some  of  his  fellow  policymakers  in  the 
Southern Cone, who believed both in their policies and that sustaining them 
even when they were not  working was the only way to make them work, 
Delfim was more pragmatic. Yet it is a measure of the gap between ongoing 
political liberalization and  the technocratic monopoly on  economic policy 
formulation that he yielded to external influence rather than domestic critics. 
More orthodox policies  of  restraint  became  the  order of  the day.  Capital 
expenditures  of state enterprises were a principal target, both to reduce the budget 
deficit and to limit imports. Total loans to the private sector were limited to no 
more  than  a 50  percent increase over their  December  1980 nominal  value. 
Controls were removed from all loan rates, except for credit to agriculture and to 
exports. Monetary expansion was severely limited, provoking a liquidity short- 
age. Real interest rates rose from large negative to positive levels. Firms cut back 
on production and tied to work down their bloated, and increasingly expensive, 
inventories. Private investment declined. These deflationary impulses produced a 
decline in gross output of 1.6 percent between 1980 and 1981 and an even larger 
drop in industrial production. Urban unemployment became overt. Brazil had 
entered a period of falling income that was to prove more severe than the setback 
of the Great Depression. 
The strategy followed in 1981 was to conform to the shortage of  foreign 
exchange by  reducing absorption. Devaluation was ruled out by  the failed 
attempt of  late  1979 and the prevailing belief  in  limited opportunities for 
export in the midst of  a world recession. 
The immediate gains from the new policy were relatively modest. Inflation 
decelerated from 121 percent in 1980 to 94 percent in 1981. The trade balance 
moved  into  modest  surplus.  The  primary  cffcct  of  the  recession  was  to 
unloose a new flow of capital from commercial banks, placing Brazil further 
in debt. Instead of conceding the need for more fundamental changes and then 
implementing such changes, Delfim’s primary stabilization objective was to 
retain international creditworthiness and avert a liquidity crisis. 
In other words, it was a poor recession, just as the preceding period had been 
a false prosperity. To avoid going to the IMF,  Brazil undertook an even more 
severe short-term stabilization to persuade international creditors of its sincerity. 
But in so doing, Brazil lacked a program of real adjustment or coherent strategy 
for coping with its expanding, and increasingly short-term and interbank, debt. 
The balance of payments problem thus remained. The real exchange rate, 
after an acceleration of the mini-devaluations in the second half of  198  1, was 
not quite back to where it had been in early 1979. Now, with the dollar-to 
which  the  cruzeiro was linked-appreciating  , more aggressive policies to 296  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
improve the trade balance were necessary.  Export growth, aided by restora- 
tion of  subsidies to manufactured products,  was respectable in  1981 but not 
spectacular. Almost as much of the trade improvement was achieved by more 
rigorous import controls. During  1982, exchange rate devaluation again fell 
behind Brazilian relative inflation,  causing resumed appreciation. 
On the internal side, the tight monetary policy and fiscal restraint were not 
sustained. The deficit of the consolidated federal public sector actually rose, 
and in 1982 it reached 8.5  percent of GDP (see chap. 5). While controls over 
the  money  supply  were  apparently  effective,  with  large  real  declines  in 
liquidity  as measured by  narrow M1  and M2 aggregates,  internal debt was 
used instead to finance the deficit. In 1981 and 1982, the augmented series of 
money  and  quasi  money  (M4)  exceeded  inflation.  Progressively  greater 
reliance on internal  debt, which was to increase from 15 to 30 percent  of 
GDP between  1980 and 1984, was a very dangerous course. (See figure 3.1 
for the recent evolution of the debt of the public sector.) Since interest rates 
were  much  higher  than  the  growth  of  revenues,  today’s  finance  was 
converted into tomorrow’s larger deficit. In general, a potentially  destabiliz- 
ing situation results,  in which explosive growth  of  the debt can crowd out 
real  capital  formation  and  lead  to ever  higher  interest  rates.  In  Brazilian 
circumstances, it also meant fewer degrees of freedom with respect to policy 
as government bonds had to be guaranteed against changes in the exchange 
rate and not only against domestic inflation. 
The hope was that a short, albeit severe, recession would permit Brazil to 
resume  its  access  to  external  finance  and  economic  growth.  The  crucial 
November  election loomed  in  1982, and government  hopes  for controlling 
the  selection of  the  next  president,  turned  on a respectable  showing.  That 
objective  helps  to  explain  why,  despite  the  gathering  clouds  in  financial 
Fig. 3.1 
1981  82  83  84  1985 
Public sector debt (year-end, as a share of GDP) 297  BrazWChapter 3 
markets in early  1982, domestic restraint eased and industrial decline was 
moderated. The political motivation was reinforced by  the recalcitrance of 
inflation; it stopped falling in 1982, making the tradeoff with excess capacity 
much more unfavorable than in the previous year. 
The government was  later to  blame the decline  in  exports  in  1982 on 
spreading international recession, the increase in net interest payments on the 
high international interest rates, and the closure of  financial markets on the 
Malvinas/Falklands war  and the Mexican  default.  As  was  shown in table 
3.1,  Brazil  by  1982  was  indeed  laboring  under  very  adverse  external 
conditions. But the recession of  1981  -82  was also poorly managed. 
3.4  Going to the Fund 
Brazil waited too long to approach the Fund formally, only going after the 
election although contacts had  been established earlier. Already by  March 
1982, the net reserves of the Central Bank were negative. Until virtually the 
very end, however, the technocrats insisted that they were capable and that 
Brazil was different from its profligate neighbors. Indeed, before going to the 
IMF, Brazil put together in October its own spartan plan for presentation to 
the private banks, a plan calling for minimal finance and exuding confidence: 
“It is precisely this blending of short- and long-term adjustment which will 
create the preconditions for the Brazilian economy to find a path of relatively 
more stable economic growth with smaller imbalances and being threatened 
neither by  growing  inflationary  pressures  nor  by  the  unforecastability of 
external factors”  (Conselho Monetario Nacional 1982, 10). 
And it was precisely this blending that had been absent in the previous three 
years. Policy had been very much oriented toward short-term goals and was 
frequently altered.  Ad  hocery  was  rampant.  Solutions were  designed for 
immediate  problems,  but  frequently  introduced new  distortions  that  later 
would inhibit effective policy. The government failed to clear out the baggage 
of  credit subsidies and tax incentives inherited from the past and establish 
meaningful priorities. Domestic political support was irrelevant. The judge 
and jury were the external creditors. Planning and finance ministers undertook 
well-orchestrated forays to  the exterior to  assure and reassure that overly 
optimistic targets were securely within reach. Meanwhile, domestic credibil- 
ity dissipated. Delfim remained in office because there was not even enough 
governmental capability to define an alternative strategy. 
When  agreement was reached in December  1982 with  the  international 
banks to reschedule principal and provide new  finance, Delfim announced 
that  a  letter of  intent  was  being  presented to  the  IMF.  The  Fund  board 
approved it with special speed to reassure the financial community that the 
debt crisis was under control. The Fund program  incorporated the limited 
relief that had been previously asked of the private banks. Table 3.2 provides 
details of  the quantitative internal and external performance criteria Brazil 
was obligated to fulfill in return. Table 3.2  IMF Agreements: Quantitative Performance Criteria 
Predicted Values 
January  February  September  November  March  November  December 
1983  1983  1983  1983  1984  1984  1984  Actual 
(letter  #I)  (letter  #2)  (letter  #3)  (letter  #4)  (letter  #5)  (letter  #6)  (letter  #7)  Values 
Borrowing Requirement of  the Public Sector (billions of  cruzeiros) 
1983  March  1,200  2,800 
June  3,200  5,000 
September  5,000  6,600  14,900 





1984  March 
1985  March 
Operational Deficit (billions of  cruzeiros)** 
1983  December 






1985  March 
Monetary Authorities' Net Domestic Assets (billions of  cruzeiros) 
1983  March  4,050  6,150 
June  4,650  6,950 
September  5,150  7,550  5,600 












600  1,100 









35,500  48,536 
70,000  121,125 
3.629 
-638' 
-  1,692* 
587* 
6,169 






6,685 3,300  5,350 
4,550 
2,800  1,600 
-  50 






1984  March  4,365 
June  3,105 
September  223 
1985  March  -  5,ooo  -6,659 
June  -  7,750  -  14,257 
Changes in Net International Reserves, relative to December of  the previous year (US$ billion) 
December  -  2,064 
1983  March  -1.5  -  1.6 
June  -1.5  -  1.8 
September  -0.7  -3.1  -  2.8 
December  0.0  0.0  -3.3 
1984  March  2.7 
June  4.2 
September  5.8 
December  7.0 
1985  March  (no targets) 
Increase in Net External Indebtedness (US$ billion) 
1983  March  2.2  3.0  1.3 
June  3.0  4.5  2.5 
September  4.0  5.3  2.7 
1984  March  3.9  3.1 
September  9.  I  8.6  7.0 
December  10.8  8.4 
1985  March  0.8 
June  1.7 
December  6.0  6.0  3.5 
June  6.8  5.1 
September  -0.007 
Source:  Banco Central do Brasil, Brasil: Program Economiro, various issues. 
*As estimated by  the Central Bank In early 1985. 
**Operational deficit is equal to the BRPS minus payments of  monetary correction on government bonds. 
5.5 
9.0 
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Central to the  initial letter of  intent and its modifications was a targeted 
$6 billion trade surplus in 1983. Exchange rate devaluation of one percentage 
point per month in excess of inflation  was deemed adequate. External debt 
was  to  increase  modestly.  Limited  public  sector  borrowing  and  drastic 
restraint  on net domestic credit (to the extent of a decline by one-half in its 
estimated previous year value) were the operative elements on the domestic 
side.  Government  expenditures  were  to  be  reduced  to  conform  to  the 
reduction in borrowing requirements.  By the end of the year, an inflation rate 
of 78 percent was to be attained as a result of such policies. 
Barely had the first letter been issued than it was necessary  to modify the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and domestic credit limits. The 
February  devaluation of  30 percent following  a wave of  speculation in the 
black  market  made  the  earlier  nominal  values  meaningless.  Larger  credit 
allocation was allowed for export promotion and import substitution to help 
achieve the external goals. Monetary correction of government indexed bonds 
to match the devaluation of exchange rate altered borrowing requirements. 
The  next  series  of  letters  of  intent  was  provoked  by  the  continuing 
acceleration  of  inflation.  Only  three  months  after  formal  approval  of  the 
stabilization program, the IMF suspended the scheduled $2 billion disburse- 
ment because the government failed to reduce its nominal deficits. This was 
no surprise, since any shortfall in attaining the inflation target translated into 
far  different  nominal  results  for  equivalent  real  magnitudes.  Two major 
supply shocks-the  30 percent February devaluation and the upward trend of 
agricultural  prices-combined  with  indexation  to  prevent  contractionary 
monetary policies from reducing inflation.  In fact, inflation reached the 200 
percent level during 1983. 
Two  modifications  were  introduced.  One reduced  the  extent  of  wage 
indexation. The IMF insisted upon limiting inflation adjustment of wages to 
80 percent of any rise in the new consumer price index, despite the tendency 
of the INPC index already to understate true inflation. Thus there was explicit 
recognition of the force of inertial inflation. After considerable reluctance and 
the imposition of executive pressure, the Congress acceded. The other change 
was also a response  to recalcitrant  inflation. After prolonged  discussion,  a 
new measure of the deficit, the “operational  deficit,”  was introduced. In this 
concept,  the  payment  of  monetary  correction  on  the  public  debt  was 
subtracted from the global PSBR (see chap. 5, app. 2, for more detail). The 
allowance for the effects  of passive  response  to inflation  provided  a better 
measure of feasible fiscal restraint. 
These changes did  not  obviate the  need  for more  new  letters  of  intent. 
After the four in 1983, there were an additional three in 1984. They arose, as 
can be seen from table  3.2, largely  as a result of the violation of targeted 
nominal public sector borrowing requirements.  Domestic inflation remained 
immune to reduction in 1984, despite controls over increases in net domestic 
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objectives were overfulfilled, on the whole. After the sharp decline in output 
in 1983, steeper than that of  1981, there was even a modest recovery in 1984 
to which rapid growth in industrial exports contributed. 
3.5  Evaluating the IMF Program 
The  Fund  program  of  1983- 84  provoked  increasing  criticism  within 
Brazil  for  being  an  inadequate  response  to  its  difficulties.  Much  of  the 
opposition  was  directed  to  the  continuation  of  onerous  external  interest 
payments. In magnitude these payments came to rival the entire import bill. 
Or to put it another way, debt service, even with rescheduled principal, came 
to about half of export earnings. 
Creditors were reluctant to concede a multiyear rescheduling along the lines of 
the Mexican agreement. That would have postponed a larger part of the principal 
that was coming due in the future, as well as reduced spreads. The longer that the 
agreement was delayed, the less sense it started to make, as it became clear that 
the soon-to-be successor government was likely to be led by the opposition. The 
Fund itself was always unhappy with Brazil’s performance and lack of  compli- 
ance with policy targets. The series of revised letters of intent from Brazil offset 
the favorable impact of its excellent trade performance. 
The case  of  Brazil  epitomized  the limits  of  the  IMF approach.  Despite 
favorable  management  of  the  trade  account,  internal  stabilization  and  a 
sound  basis  for  renewed  economic  growth  did  not  follow.  Rather  than 
decelerating,  inflation  more  than  doubled.  Meanwhile,  high  real  interest 
rates  (figure  3.2), the  counterpart  of  tighter  money  and large  government 
sales of debt, discouraged  private  investment.  Together  with  controls over 
Fig. 3.2  Real interest rate nets of taxes (CDB: 30 days, average monthly 
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public investment, this led to a decline in the ratio of  gross capital formation 
to only 16 percent in 1984, just about its lowest level of the postwar period. 
Since the inception of the program, the public sector deficit was continuously 
pressured  by the rapid growth of internal and external interest payments. 
Figure 3.3 shows that the share in GDP of the current account net of factor 
payments has turned positive since  1983. To  critics of  the IMF stabilization 
approach, the  stark  asymmetry  of  the  results  obtained  on the  balance  of 
payments and domestic stability came as no great surprise.  Contrary to the 
IMF’s  implicit monetarist model, the Brazilian experience  confirms  a very 
different  interpretation.  Improving  the  external  accounts  has  become  an 
important source of internal disequilibrium. 
The very policies required to permit large trade surpluses and payment of 
external  interest  add  to  inflation  and  subtract  from  investment.  Thus 
aggressive devaluation of  exchange rates reflects itself  sooner or later,  and 
mostly sooner, in domestic inflation because of  the ubiquity  of  indexing.  In 
addition, the public sector must attract ever larger resources from the private 
sector in order to service the now largely public external debt. When it does 
so on a voluntary basis, interest rates are high and become a source of higher 
costs  that  are  passed  along  to  prices.  In  addition,  government  deficits, 
whether financed by money or internal debt, then maintain nominal demand 
and sustain the inflation. The state is too weak to raise taxes and accomplish 
the large transfer needed in a noninflationary  way. 
The extensive resources that have been transferred externally, amounting 
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income proportionally, have come primarily  at the expense of  investment. 
Consumption  outlays  have  resisted  further  compression.  Even  with  the 
changes in the wage-indexing arrangements required by the IMF, there were 
limits  to  further  declines  in  standards  of  living.  Saving  has  not  been 
responsive  despite  the  continuation  of  high  real  interest  rates;  bank 
certificates of  deposit net of  taxes were highly positive in 1984. 
These economic circumstances,  despite attempts to  show that  Brazilian 
performance was  better  than  elsewhere  in  Latin  America,  and  despite  a 
modest recovery  led by  manufactured exports  in  1984, contributed to the 
Figueiredo government’s loss of political control. The rules of  succession, 
which  had  been  thought  to  assure  not  only  continued  dominance of  the 
government party but also one more military president to guide transition, 
proved unable to withstand the clear lack of popular acquiescence. Tancredo 
Neves  was  selected  by  the  electoral  college  in  January  1985.  With  his 
untimely death before he assumed office, the New Republic’s leadership fell 
to JosC  Sarney. 
3.6  After 1985 
During much of  1985 and  1986 the debt issue and the problem of  the 
balance of  payments took a back seat to domestic economic policies in the 
new  government. Economic recovery quickened, but was accompanied by 
accelerating inflation. Brazil’s trade balance remained positive and adequate 
to service its interest payments up to mid-1986. Falling oil prices and interest 
rates, and sharply increased terms of trade in 1986, added up to significantly 
improved external conditions. From a high of 62 percent in 1982, the ratio of 
interest payments to exports  fell to 44 percent in  1985 and 45 percent in 
1986. The absence of  additional capital flows meant real reductions in the 
level of the debt after the end of  1984. 
In these circumstances it is not surprising to see the recent external crisis 
blamed exclusively on poor domestic policy and the failure of the Cruzado 
Plan.  Roberto  Campos,  a  former planning minister in  the  first post-1964 
government and now a senator from the opposition party, prominently did so 
in  the  national  and  international press.  He was joined  by  Luis Inficio da 
Silva, better known as Lula, the leader of the Labor party on the other side 
of  the  political  spectrum.  Both  have  been  joined  by  countless  external 
observers who  emphasize that  there is no guarantee that  exaggerated real 
domestic targets will not confront balance of payments constraints. Wishing 
to grow at high rates, and even needing such growth for laudable political 
ends, does not make it come true. 
The large debt burden of Brazil, however, was an important contributing 
factor to the failure of  domestic policy that was a proximate cause of  the 
precipitate decline in the trade surplus and the inability to continue normal 
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capital flows to finance larger imports,  the effect of  the drain of  external 
interest  payments  on  domestic  capital  formation,  and  the  immediate 
vulnerability of the balance of payments to even temporary shocks. 
First,  it  was  unrealistic to  expect  Brazilian imports  to  remain  at  low 
levels despite accelerating growth and to project large continuing surpluses. 
Import  elasticity  is  especially  high  when  increased  investment  becomes 
necessary after a first phase of  using up excess capacity. A popular view in 
Brazil  was  that  import  substitution  had  proceeded  so  far  and  so 
successfully that  requirements were  permanently reduced,  and  that  made 
the debt,  and the required surpluses, less central to domestic strategy than 
it  ought  to  have  been.  Especially  in  the  context  of  the  Cruzado  Plan, 
capital inflows  would  have  been  of  considerable assistance in  permitting 
import  liberalization  and  thus  a  market  check  to  inflation,  rather  than 
relying on price controls alone. 
In the second instance, the large resource transfer, amounting to more than 
$30  billion  in  three  years,  made  it  difficult  to  sustain  domestic  capital 
accumulation. Consumption could not be compressed to make the transfer; 
indeed, pent-up demand further reduced domestic saving, thereby aggravat- 
ing  the  domestic  imbalance.  In  addition,  transfers  of  that  magnitude- 
amounting to some 4 or 5 percent of product-complicated  fiscal policy. The 
public sector was the principal remitter; it had to compete for the surplus of 
the private sector. A bias toward government deficits was a consequent, and 
ultimately disastrous, result. 
Thirdly, the fact of a large foreign debt gave little scope for error. Even a 
few months of diminished international performance were sufficient to erode 
reserves and provoke strong policy reactions. Those measures in November 
1986 were badly  received  and contributed to the lack of  credibility and  a 
generalized sense of  deterioration that quickly became self-fulfilling as the 
year ended and 1987 began. There was little time to regroup or to formulate 
new  approaches. A moratorium on interest payments became inevitable. 
A  large debt creates its  own  special problems for the  formulation and 
implementation of policy, as the United States too is beginning to appreciate. 
This is not to exculpate Brazil’s responsibility in  not sustaining its export 
growth. While everyone was busy citing Brazil as an example of  successful 
adjustment, Brazilian export volume, after an increase of about 20 percent in 
1984, grew by less than 2 percent in 1985 and declined by  8 percent in 1986. 
Irregular export performance has plagued Brazil even when its exchange rate 
policies have avoided extreme overvaluation. But that is precisely why  the 
debt problem  is  so  serious and  so  damaging  to  Brazilian  developmental 
prospects.  Ignoring  the  difficulty  by  projecting  high  compound  rates  of 
export growth is only more wishful thinking. 
Any serious analysis of the sad denouement of late 1986 and early 1987 is 
thus  incomplete  without  reference  to  the  larger  story  of  the  risky,  and 
ultimately mismanaged, Brazilian adjustment policy via external debt since 
the early 1970s. 